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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent New Jersey Supreme Court case, Battaglia v. United 
Parcel Service, Inc.,1 effectively broadened protection against retaliation 
afforded to employees under New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination 
(“LAD”).2  This judiciary action is consistent with a predictable national 
trend, stemming from recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
employer retaliation liability based upon the “purpose” of the statute 
rather than the explicit language contained in the statute.3  The Supreme 
Court’s interpretation increases the protection afforded to employees by 
eliminating potential loopholes for employer liability that result from a 
more textualist reading. This new standard, however, also increases the 
risk of frivolous claims resulting in harm to judicial economy and creates 
issues of horizontal equity due to the malleability of a standard 
formulated based upon the purpose and spirit of a statute rather than its 
language. 
In order to address these problems while effectively protecting the 
rights of employees, the New Jersey Supreme Court needs to clarify the 
good faith reasonable belief standard articulated in Battaglia.  The 
Battaglia court held that as long as an employee can demonstrate a good-
faith belief that the alleged conduct violated the LAD or that the conduct 
was simply inconsistent with the objectives of the LAD, he or she is not 
required to show actual discrimination against an identifiable victim.4  
This Note examines the good faith reasonable standard’s evolution and 
application in federal courts, as well as its recent articulation in New 
Jersey state courts.  While this Note approves of the protection afforded 
by such a standard in retaliation cases, it proposes a clarification of its 
application for New Jersey courts. 
Part II discusses the LAD and the recent trend of rising retaliation 
claims across the nation.  Part III analyzes Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and other federal anti-retaliation statutes based on the 
purpose of the statutes, rather than the text.  Further, Part III discusses 
cases in which the Court took a different approach in interpreting 
retaliation statutes.  Part IV highlights the decisions of lower courts which 
have applied the Supreme Court’s anti-retaliation standard differently 
 
1 214 N.J. 518 (2013). 
2 Id. 
3 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1997). 
4 Battaglia, 214 N.J. 518. 
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than the New Jersey Supreme Court in Battaglia.  Part V analyzes the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding in Battaglia.  Part VI explores the 
potential interpretations and consequences of the Battaglia holding.  
Finally, Part VII concludes that while the holding in Battaglia, 
specifically the reasoning behind the holding, is consistent with the 
reasoning behind recent United States Supreme Court anti-retaliation 
cases, the actual implications of the decision remain unclear and will pose 
problems in application for lower courts in New Jersey. 
 
II. HISTORY OF THE LAD AND RECENT TRENDS IN RETALIATION 
CLAIMS 
A. New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination 
New Jersey has one of the most comprehensive antidiscrimination 
statutes in the nation.5  The LAD predates the state’s constitution and was 
originally enacted in April of 1945.6  The statute was enacted in 
recognition of the state’s public policy against discrimination with an 
objective explained by the New Jersey Supreme Court as, “nothing less 
than the eradication of the cancer of discrimination.”7  To maximize its 
intended protection of victims of discrimination, the LAD explicitly 
provides that it be construed liberally.8  New Jersey courts have 
acknowledged that the purpose of the LAD is to protect not only 
employees, but also the general public’s interest in eradicating 
discrimination.9 
As amended over the years, the LAD prohibits employment 
discrimination against any person based on race, creed, color, national 
origin, ancestry, age, sex, gender identity or expression, affection or 
sexual orientation, marital status, familial status, liability for service in 
the Armed Forces, disability or nationality.10  The LAD also makes it 
 
5 1945 N.J. Laws 169 (as amended N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1–42 (West 1945)).  
6 Id. 
7 Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 600 (1993); Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 
652, 660 (N.J. 1988). 
8 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 2007) (stating that “[the harms of discrimination] 
have, under the common law, given rise to legal remedies, including compensatory and 
punitive damages.  The Legislature intends that such damages be available to all persons 
protected by the Act and this Act shall be liberally construed in combination with other 
protection available under the laws of this state”). 
9 Cedeno v. Montclair State Univ., 750 A.2d 73, 75 (N.J. 2000) (“The purpose of both 
the LAD and CEPA is deterrence of improper employer conduct to protect society from the 
vestiges of discrimination.”). 
10 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1. 
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illegal “[f]or any person to take reprisals against any person because that 
person has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act[.]”11 
New Jersey courts have interpreted the LAD to require three 
elements for a retaliation claim: (1) the employee “engaged in a protected 
activity known to the [employer,]” (2) the employee was “subjected to an 
adverse employment decision,” and (3) there was a causal link between 
the protected activity and the adverse employment action.12  Additionally, 
to be protected, a plaintiff’s opposition to alleged discrimination must be 
both reasonable and made in good faith.13 
New Jersey courts often look to federal precedent when interpreting 
Title VII “as a key source of interpretive authority” in construing the 
terms of the LAD, but, as we will see, state courts are sometimes more 
protective of plaintiffs than federal courts.14 
 
B. Title VII and the Nationwide Rise in Retaliation Claims 
The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (“Title VII”), makes it an unlawful employment practice to 
discriminate against an employee because (1) he has opposed any practice 
made unlawful by this subchapter, or (2) he made a charge, assisted, 
testified, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this subchapter.15  The Supreme Court has described the “purpose” of the 
anti-retaliation provision as, “seek[ing] to secure [the] primary objective 
[of ending workplace discrimination] by preventing an employer from 
interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or 
advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”16 
According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”), retaliation claims became the most common charges filed 
with the EEOC as of 2009.17  The total number of charges filed decreased 
 
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(d) (West 2014), see Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 
A.2d 944, 958 (N.J. 1999) (discussing LAD); Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 
650 A.2d 958, 971 (N.J. 1994). 
12 Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 675 A.2d 684, 695 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
13 Carmona v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 915 A.2d 518, 522 (N.J. 2007). 
14 Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 452 (1993); Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. 
Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 906 (N.J. 1990). 
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); David Long-Daniels 
& Peter N. Hall, Risky Business: Litigating Retaliation Claims, 28 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
437 (2013). 
16 Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). 
17 EEOC, Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 2014). 
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by over 500 from 2010 to 2012; however, during that same time period, 
retaliation charges increased by over 1,500.18  This increase is consistent 
with a trend over the last decade in which the number of retaliation 
charges has more than doubled.19  Beyond the statistical increase in claims 
filed, the EEOC itself has seemingly increased its focus on retaliation 
claims.20  As the September 4, 2012 version of the EEOC’s Strategic 
Enforcement Plan makes clear, “the EEOC views retaliation as a direct 
affront to its law enforcement obligations and an intolerable denial of 
access to courts for victims of discrimination.”21  The EEOC targets 
policies and practices that discourage individuals from exercising rights 
granted under employment discrimination statutes, including retaliatory 
actions.22  The increase in retaliation claims does not demonstrate any 
signs of slowing in the near future, and, on both a federal and New Jersey 
state level, the law has recently shifted to favor plaintiffs who assert 
retaliation claims.23 
Retaliation claims pose a major difficulty for employers.24  If the 
employer allows the retaliation claim to proceed to trial, jurors are more 
likely to believe and sympathize with a plaintiff employee than with a 
plaintiff claiming status-based discrimination because an average juror 
has likely experienced some form of retaliation in his or her lifetime.25  
This is in part because New Jersey mandates that prospective jurors be 
excused from service if it will create a financial hardship.26  Generally 
speaking, trials involving claims based on the LAD consume more time 
than routine motor vehicle accident cases and trip-and-fall cases.27  As a 
 
18 Id. 
19 EEOC, Retaliation-Based Charges FY 1997-FY 2013, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/retaliation.cfm (last visited Sept. 18, 
2014). 
20 Long-Daniels & Hall, supra note 15, at 438. 
21 Long-Daniels & Hall, supra note 15, at 438. 
22 Long-Daniels & Hall, supra note 15, at 438–39. 
23 Long-Daniels & Hall, supra note 15, at 448.  But cf. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. 
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (holding that a plaintiff must prove retaliation causation using 
“but for” causation, not a lessened standard). 
24 Stuart W. Davidson & Scott M. Pollins, Determining Employment Discrimination Case 
Merits Under State and Federal Law, ASPATORE, *1, *6 (2012), available at 2012 WL 
3058210. 
25 Id. 
26 State v. Biegenwald, 524 A.2d 130, 138 (N.J. 1987); Telephone Interview with Judge 
James P. Savio, J.S.C., Judge in the Civil Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey, 
Atlantic County (Sept. 24, 2013) (hereinafter “Judge Savio”). 
27 Judge Savio, supra note 26.  
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result, the issue of juror bias is exacerbated because self-employed 
individuals, who would probably be more sympathetic to the position of 
an employer, are generally excused from jury service.28  For the self-
employed, jury service is a financial hardship as compared to employees 
who are typically paid their normal salaries by their employers while 
serving; thus, those employees do not experience any financial hardship. 
Moreover, because of the fee-shifting provisions under the LAD, the 
employer in a best-case scenario is responsible for the payment of its own 
attorney’s fees, but in the event the plaintiff is successful, the employer 
is also responsible for the counsel fees of the plaintiff.29  Therefore, the 
longer the litigation process, the greater the financial burden on the 
employer for counsel fees.30  As we will see, the Supreme Court’s 
repeated expansion of employee protection poses a significant challenge 
to employers and increases the likelihood a jury will hear a given claim.31 
 
III.  SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL RETALIATION    
 CLAIMS 
The Supreme Court has justified recently broadening the scope of 
the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII in terms of the “purpose” of the 
statute rather than the text, noting that the provision, “seeks to secure [the] 
primary objective [of ending workplace discrimination] by preventing an 
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s 
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”32  
A discussion of several decisions illuminates the scope of the Supreme 
Courts’ broadening, as well as the justification and purpose of the 
generous interpretation. 
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases addressing Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision was Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,33 which set the stage 
for a purposive approach to anti-retaliation provisions.  In Robinson, the 
Court held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision covered current 
employees, job applicants and former employees—although read 
literally, its language does not reach former employees.34  The plaintiff in 
 
28 Judge Savio, supra note 26. 
29 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-27.1 (West 2002). 
30 Judge Savio, supra note 26. 
31 Judge Savio, supra note 26. 
32 Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).  But see Univ. of 
Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532–33 (2013). 
33 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
34 Id. at 345–46. 
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Robinson was fired and subsequently filed a complaint with the EEOC 
alleging race-based discrimination.35  While the complaint was pending, 
the plaintiff applied for another job and received a negative job reference 
from his previous employer, which he believed was retaliation for his 
EEOC complaint.36 
The language of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision grants 
protection to “employees” and “applicants for employment;” 
nevertheless, the Robinson Court concluded that this language was 
ambiguous and that former employees were also protected.37  In 
explaining the holding, the Court began the trend of relying on the 
“purpose” of the anti-retaliation provision to broaden its scope.38  The 
Court noted that a narrow interpretation of the term “employee” would 
contradict the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision, which is to 
maintain “unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”39 
In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,40 the Supreme Court 
addressed the relationship between discrimination and retaliation.  In 
Jackson, a high-school girls basketball coach supported his team’s Title 
IX right to equal treatment and consequently lost his coaching position.41  
Title IX explicitly prohibits discrimination based upon sex, but contains 
no explicit language addressing retaliation.42  The Supreme Court 
nevertheless held that Congress’ failure to include a retaliation provision 
was not dispositive.43  More importantly, the Court held that retaliation 
for complaining about sex discrimination was a form of sex 
discrimination in and of itself.44  It noted that the efficacy of the statute 
would be called into question if the protection did not extend beyond 
victims of discrimination to complainants like Coach Jackson.45 
The United States Supreme Court next increased employee 
protection in the Title VII retaliation context with its 2006 decision in 
 
35 Id. at 339. 
36 Id.  
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012); Id. at 345–46.  
38 Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345–46. 
39 Id. at 346.  
40 544 U.S. 176 (2005); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEO World, 89 IND. L.J. 
115, 121 (2014). 
41 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172. 
42 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West 2014). 
43 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174–75. 
44 Id. at 173–75, 178. 
45 Brake, supra note 40, at 121. 
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Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway. Co. v. White46 by broadly 
defining actions constituting retaliation.  In that case, plaintiff Sheila 
White argued that she was retaliated against by being (1) reassigned to a 
dirtier, more difficult and less desirable job and, (2) suspended without 
pay for thirty-seven days, although she was eventually reinstated with 
back pay.47  The Supreme Court expanded the reach of retaliation 
protection in two ways.  First, the Court held that retaliation claims are 
not limited to workplace conduct, a somewhat surprising holding since 
the retaliatory actions taken against Sheila White were directly related to 
both her employment and workplace conduct.48  Therefore, the case, did 
not require the Supreme Court to broaden the reach of retaliation claims 
to include out of work conduct.  The Court nonetheless chose to broaden 
the definition of retaliation to include actions not directly related to 
employment and harm outside of the workplace, opening up employers 
to liability in a much broader set of circumstances. 
Second, the Court rejected any requirement that retaliation is 
actionable only if it constitutes an “ultimate” employment action.49  
Instead, the Court determined that a plaintiff must show only “that a 
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially 
adverse, ‘which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”‘50  While the “materially adverse” standard does not 
permit suit for “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good 
manners,” it does recognize a wide variety of workplace harms as 
retaliatory.51  This test, while still requiring the employer to exhibit 
retaliatory intent, significantly changes the main focus of the retaliation 
analysis from the employer’s actual conduct, to what the reasonable 
employee believes about the employer’s action.52 
The Burlington Northern Court analyzed the reasonable employee 
 
46 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
47 Id. at 57, 59. 
48 Id. at 63 (“An employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions 
not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace.”). 
49 Id. at 67 (“The scope of the anti-retaliation provision extends beyond the workplace-
related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm.”). 
50 Id. at 68 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); Michael 
J. Zimmer, A Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. REV. 917, 
920 (2009). 
51 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68–69 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 
(D.C. Cir. 2006)); see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 920–21. 
52 See Davidson, supra note 24, at 5. 
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standard when applying it to the facts of this case.53  By using the phrase 
“reasonable employee,” the Court intended the standard for judging harm 
to be objective; however, this objective standard has a subjective 
component and therefore must be judged “from the perspective of a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.”54  The Court further 
clarified, the “significance of any given act of retaliation will often 
depend upon the particular circumstances.”55  In other words, “[c]ontext 
matters.”56  Applying these freshly-coined concepts to the facts of 
Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court concluded that White’s 
reassignment may have been materially adverse to a reasonable 
employee.57  Further, the Supreme Court held that White’s suspension 
could act as a deterrent to a reasonable employee, even though White 
eventually received back pay in full.58 
Two years later, in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,59 a plaintiff sued 
his former employer alleging race discrimination and retaliation in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (“Section 1981”), a post-Civil War 
Reconstruction Era statute prohibiting discrimination based upon race in 
the creation and enforcement of contracts.60  The plaintiff, an African 
American employee, claimed that his employer discriminated against him 
because he complained about the discriminatory actions of his supervisor 
towards another African American employee.61  Section 1981 provides, 
“[a]ll persons living within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts 
. . . as enjoyed by white citizens.”62  The Court concluded that Section 
1981, while not explicitly addressing retaliation, does in fact protect 
employees who complain about race discrimination against retaliation.63  
The Court, however, did not explain the scope of this protection.64  The 
 
53 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 71. 
54 Id.; see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 920–21. 
55 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68–69; see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 920–21. 
56 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69; see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 921. 
57 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 70–72. 
58 Id. at 70, 72–73. 
59 553 U.S. 442 (2008). 
60 Id. at 445. 
61 Id.  
62 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000); see Zimmer, supra note 50, 
at 922.  
63 See CBOCS West, Inc., 553 U.S. at 448–57 (limiting discussion of § 1981's scope to 
the effect of post-contract-formation conduct); see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 922. 
64 CBOCS West, Inc., 553 U.S. at 448–57; see Zimmer, supra note 50, at 922. 
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Court found that plaintiff, as a third party who did not personally 
experience discrimination, had a cognizable claim.65  Carrying the opinion 
to its logical conclusions, the statute must at least protect employees from 
retaliation for having complained about race discrimination against 
another person and not just against the employee him or herself.66 
In 2008, the Supreme Court addressed retaliation in the context of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as applied to federal sector 
workers—the relevant language prohibits discrimination based upon age 
without explicitly mentioning retaliation.67  In Gomez-Perez, the Court 
held that the prohibition includes protection from retaliation, relying on 
the broad ban on discrimination and the general language of the provision 
itself.68 
More recently, the Supreme Court addressed Title VII retaliation in 
Thompson v. North American Stainless, L.P.69  Here, Thompson’s fiancée 
filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC.70  Three weeks after the 
charge was filed, Thompson was fired.71  The Supreme Court utilized a 
two-step analysis for Thompson’s retaliation claim: (1) whether 
Thompson’s termination constituted retaliation under Title VII and, if so, 
(2) whether such termination gave Thompson (as opposed to his fiancée) 
a retaliation claim.72  In a unanimous 8–0 decision, the Court held that it 
was “obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging 
in protected activity if she knew that her fiancé would be fired.”73  
Consequently, the Court held that Thompson’s fiancée did have a viable 
claim for retaliation based on Thompson’s termination.74  However, the 
Court cautioned that not every act of retaliation against a third party 
would meet the Burlington Northern standard.75 
 
65 CBOCS West, Inc., 553 U.S. at 452; see Zimmer, supra note 49, at 922. 
66 CBOCS West, Inc., 553 U.S. at 452; see Zimmer, supra note 49, at 922. 
67 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (2006); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008). 
68 Gomez-Perez, 553 U.S. at 468–88. 
69 131 S. Ct. 863, 867 (2011) (recusing herself, Justice Kagan took no part in the 
consideration of this case). 
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 Id.; Jessica Fink, Protected by Association? The Supreme Court’s Incomplete 
Approach to Defining the Scope of the Third-Party Retaliation Doctrine, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 
521, 527 n. 123 (2011). 
74 Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870. 
75 Id. at 868 (“We expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the 
Burlington standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never 
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Next, the Court examined whether Thompson could bring a 
retaliation claim.76  The Court noted that Title VII actions are limited to 
those brought “by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”77  The Court then 
adopted the “zone of interests” test used in the Administrative Procedure 
Act, which provides that a plaintiff “may not sue unless he falls within 
the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision 
whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.”78  In terms of 
Title VII, the “zone of interests” test means that any employee with an 
interest “arguably [sought] to be protected by the statutes” may sue.79  The 
Supreme Court held that Title VII intended to protect individuals, such 
as Thompson, harmed by the intentional and unlawful conduct of an 
employer.80  Once again, the Court broadened the scope of Title VII, by 
relying not on the statutory language itself but, rather upon the “purpose” 
or “intent” of the statute.81 
The Thompson holding dispensed any requirement that the plaintiff 
must engage in a statutorily protected activity.82  In terms of the statutory 
text, Thompson did not qualify under either the “opposition clause” or 
the “participation clause.”83  Analyzing the importance of the Thompson 
decision, David Long-Daniels noted, “[i]n the end, the lesson of 
Thompson is that third-party retaliation creates two distinct claims for 
retaliation: one claim by the individual who engaged in the protected 
activity and a separate claim by the individual who suffered the brunt of 
the retaliation.”84 
Although the trend seems to be broadening employers’ liability 
under Title VII and other federal discrimination retaliation statutes based 
upon the purpose or spirit of the statutes, the Court has taken a different 
approach in several cases.  In Clark County School District v. Breeden,85 
a female plaintiff met with her male supervisor and another male 
 
do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to generalize.”). 
76 Id. at 870. 
77 Id. at 869 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006)). 
78 Id. at 870 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006)) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 
497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)). 
79 Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870 (quoting Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank 
& Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495 (1998)). 
80 Id.; Long-Daniels, supra note 15, at 442. 
81 Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870; Long-Daniels, supra note 15, at 442. 
82 Long-Daniels, supra note 15, at 442. 
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(3)(a) (2014). 
84 Long-Daniels, supra note 15, at 442. 
85 532 U.S. 268, 269 (2001).  
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employee to review psychological evaluation reports of job applicants.86  
One of the reports disclosed that an applicant had once commented to a 
co-worker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand 
Canyon.”87  The supervisor stated that he did not know what the statement 
meant and the other employee present replied, “Well, I’ll tell you later,” 
and both men laughed.88  Subsequently, the plaintiff complained about the 
comment to both the employee and the employee’s supervisor and alleged 
that she was retaliated against for these complaints.89 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Title VII 
protected employee opposition not only to actually unlawful practices, 
but also to practices that the employee could reasonably believe were 
unlawful.90  The Supreme Court declined to address the propriety of this 
interpretation, positing, “even assuming it is correct, no one could 
reasonably believe that the incident recounted about violated Title VII.”91  
In analyzing the plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, the Court noted, 
“‘[a] recurring point in [our] opinion[s] is that simple teasing, offhand 
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not 
amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of 
employment.’”92  Accordingly, it would not be reasonable to believe such 
a comment was a violation, even if it reflected sex bias.  The Breeden 
Court did not evaluate possible alternatives to the “reasonableness” 
requirement, offer any evaluation of the standard, or even justify its use 
by examining its effect on the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision.93 
The Court most recently addressed the topic of Title VII retaliation 
claims in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar.94  
There, the plaintiff, Dr. Nassar, was a physician of Middle-Eastern 
descent who claimed that one of his supervisors, Dr. Levine, was biased 
against him on account of his religion and ethnic heritage.95  Dr. Nassar, 
a University of Texas faculty member, was offered a position at Parkland 
 
86 Id.   
87 Id. (quoting Brief in Opposition 3). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 269–70.  
90 Id. at 270. 
91 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 532 U.S. at 270.   
92 Id. at 271 (quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).  
93 Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting "Reasonableness": A New Look at Title VII's Anti-
Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (2007). 
94 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2517 (2013). 
95 Id. at 2520.  
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Memorial Hospital.96  Subsequently, he resigned from his teaching 
position at the University of Texas and sent a letter to his supervisor, Dr. 
Fitz, and others stating that he was leaving as a result of Dr. Levine’s 
harassment.97  Upon receiving the letter, Dr. Fitz expressed concern that 
Dr. Levine had been humiliated and protested to the Hospital, which 
subsequently withdrew its job offer to the plaintiff.98  The Court drew a 
sharp distinction between retaliation claims related to the withdrawal of 
employment offers, and to status-based discrimination claims (the 
original harassment claim on the basis of national origin or religion).  
Here, Dr. Nassar’s status-based discrimination claim was against Dr. 
Levine, while his retaliation claim was against Dr. Fitz.99 
Prior to Nassar, the Court required proof of “motivating factor” 
causation for claims of status-based discrimination.100  Under that 
standard, a plaintiff is only required to present sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable jury to conclude “race, color, religion, sex or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”101  Justice 
Kennedy, for the majority in Nassar, sought to define the proper standard 
of causation for Title VII retaliation claims.102  The Court discussed the 
rising number of Title VII retaliation claims in recent years and noted that 
a lessened standard of causation for retaliation claims would only 
contribute to the filing of frivolous claims and, “siphon resources from 
efforts by employer[s], administrative agencies, and courts to combat 
workplace harassment.”103  The Court continued, “[i]t would be 
inconsistent with the structure and operation of Title VII to so raise the 
costs, both financial and reputational, on an employer whose actions were 
not in fact the result of any discriminatory or retaliatory intent.”104  Justice 
Kennedy accordingly concluded that a plaintiff must prove retaliation in 
terms of “but-for” causation, not a lessened standard.105 
This recent decision, while consistent with Breeden, may show a 
 
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 2524. 
99 Id. at 2532. 
100 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95–101 (2003). 
101 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 2538 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(2)(m) 
(2006)). 
102 Id. at 2524. 
103 Id. at 2531–32; 29 NO. 8 TERM. OF EMPLOYMENT BULL. NL 1 (2013). 
104 Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 2532. 
105 Id. at 2533. 
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trend of the Supreme Court backing away from its broadened definition 
of retaliation under Title VII set out in Burlington Northern.106  Through 
the heightened standard of causation, the Court now seems to be 
attempting to reduce the number of claims by making it more difficult to 
prove retaliation.107 
 
IV.  LOWER COURTS’ APPLICATION OF THE GOOD FAITH  
 REASONABLE BELIEF STANDARD 
A discussion of lower court applications of the good faith reasonable 
belief standard articulated by the Supreme Court illuminates the 
similarities between that standard and the one the New Jersey Supreme 
Court articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Battaglia.  The 
varying applications of this standard highlight its malleability, due to its 
reliance on the broad purposes of a remedial statute rather than statutory 
language itself, and the problems it presents in terms of horizontal equity 
and judicial economy. 
In Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Division,108 the 
Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of whether a white employee 
who opposed the racially derogatory comment of a co-worker had a valid 
retaliation claim under Title VII.109  Circuit Judge Birch held, as a matter 
of first impression, that the white employee reacting to the racially 
offensive comment of the co-worker alone did not constitute statutorily-
protected activity so as to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 
Title VII.110  Plaintiff Bryan Little was a white male who worked with 
Willie Wilmot, also a white male employee.111  According to Little, 
Wilmot approached him and stated, “[n]obody runs this team but a bunch 
of niggers and I’m going to get rid of them.”112  Evidently, Little informed 
several co-workers about the statement and communicated the slur at a 
team meeting; as a result Little’s supervisor issued a “Record of 
Conversation” noting the occurrence.113  Little contended that he was 
harassed continuously from that point forward in retaliation for having 
 
106 Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 53 (2006).  
107 29 NO. 8 TERM. OF EMPLOYMENT BULL. NL 1 (2013). 
108 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997). 
109 Id. at 958. 
110 Id. at 961. 
111 Id. at 958. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
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complained about Wilmot’s conduct.114 
The Eleventh Circuit held that Little failed to show that he was 
engaged in a statutorily-protected activity.115  Judge Birch acknowledged 
that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title 
VII, “if he shows that he had a good faith, reasonable belief that the 
employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices.”116  The court 
further explained that a plaintiff must, “not only show that he subjectively 
(that is, in good faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful 
employment practices, but also that his belief was objectively 
reasonable,” although a plaintiff need not prove the underlying conduct 
was actually unlawful.117  Applying this standard, the court found Little’s 
assertion that he reasonably believed the comment to be a violation of 
Title VII to be implausible at best.118  Little did not have an objectively 
reasonable belief that he opposed an unlawful employment practice and, 
therefore, failed to set forth a prima facie case under Title VII.119  This 
decision highlights the malleability of the “reasonable employee” 
standard, which in the application of the Eleventh Circuit more closely 
resembles a requirement of correctness in terms of the unlawfulness of 
the underlying conduct, rather than a context-based, employee-friendly 
analysis.  Although the term used was racist and Little believed that it 
was unlawful, it was only spoken by a co-worker and was not severe or 
pervasive enough to contaminate the work environment.120  These 
requirements, however, are nuances of the law and seemingly have little 
to do with the reasonableness of Little’s belief. 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the standard in Silver v. KCA, Inc.,121 
where the plaintiff objected to a racially derogatory remark uttered by a 
co-worker and was subsequently fired.122  In finding that the plaintiff 
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the 
Ninth Circuit held that an employee’s opposition to a co-worker’s own 
individual act of discrimination, “does not fall within the protection of 
 
114 Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 958 (11th Cir. 1997). 
115 Id. at 959. 
116 Id. at 960. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Little, 103 F.3d at 960.  
121 586 F.2d 138 (9th Cir. 1978). 
122 Id. at 140.  
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[Title VII].”123  The court reasoned that, “[b]y the terms of the statute . . . 
not every act by an employee in opposition to racial discrimination is 
protected.  The opposition must be directed at an unlawful employment 
practice of an employer, not an act of discrimination by a private 
individual.”124  However, Silver was decided in 1978, and the Ninth 
Circuit has since clarified that a plaintiff “must only show that she had a 
‘reasonable belief’ that the employment practice she protested was 
prohibited under Title VII” in order to establish that she was engaged in 
protected activity.125  Therefore, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit are not 
required to show that the employment practice they are protesting 
actually violates Title VII.126  The reasoning of the court in this case is 
illustrative of how a court applies an anti-retaliation statute if plaintiffs 
were required to be correct about the unlawfulness of the underlying 
conduct. 
In Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp.,127 the Eleventh 
Circuit held that a grooming policy allowing female employees to have 
long hair, but not permitting male employees to do so, was not actionable 
under Title VII.128  Several male employees of Blockbuster alleged that 
the grooming policy of the employer discriminated against them based 
on sex, and that they were discharged in retaliation for protesting that 
policy.129  The grooming policy prohibited men, but not women, from 
wearing their hair long.130  The plaintiffs protested the policy by refusing 
to cut their hair and were subsequently terminated.131  In analyzing the 
plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the court noted that, while the conduct which 
the employee protests is not required to be actually unlawful, a plaintiff 
is still required to demonstrate that he or she had “a good faith, reasonable 
belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment 
practices.”132  Notably, the court explained, “the allegations and record 
must also indicate that the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was 
 
123 Id. at 142.  
124 Id. at 141. 
125 Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994); McZeal v. City of 
Seattle, No. C05-1965P, 2006 WL 3254504, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2006). 
126 Trent, 41 F.3d at 526. 
127 139 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1998). 
128 Id. at 1387.  
129 Id. at 1385. 
130 Id. at 1386.  
131 Id. at 1386−87. 
132 Id. at 1388 (quoting Little v. United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
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objectively reasonable.”133 
Holding that the plaintiffs’ belief that the grooming policy was 
illegal was objectively unreasonable, Judge Carnes took into account the 
fact that every circuit to consider grooming policies like Blockbuster’s 
has declared them non-discriminatory.134  Because the plaintiffs chose to 
protest a grooming policy despite long-standing precedent holding such 
policy was not discriminatory; the plaintiffs could not have had an 
objectively reasonable belief that the policy discriminated against them 
on the basis of their sex.135  This holding, taken to its logical conclusions, 
seems to come closer to requiring an employee to be correct regarding 
the lawfulness of the complained of activity.  Although the Eleventh 
Circuit paid lip-service to the lesser “good faith reasonable belief” 
standard, the court based it’s finding of unreasonableness on the fact that 
a long-standing precedent holding such conduct was not discriminatory.136  
In other words, the plaintiffs were incorrect about the lawfulness of the 
conduct. 
Similarly, in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.,137 the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed a dismissal of a complaint on the basis that the plaintiff 
lacked a reasonable belief that a coworker’s single statement violated 
Title VII.138  In Jordan, the plaintiff was an African American employee 
who was terminated after he complained to management about hearing a 
coworker state, “[t]hey should put those two black monkeys in a cage 
with a bunch of black apes and let the apes f—k them.”139  The Fourth 
Circuit held the comment, although racist, was not severe or pervasive 
enough to violate Title VII.140  The court based its finding of 
unreasonableness on the substantive law of racial harassment rather than 
the subjective reasonableness of the employee, or even the fact that the 
employer had a policy which obliged employees to report racially 
discriminatory conduct to management.141 
 
 
133 Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Little, 103 F.3d at 960). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1389. 
136 Id. at 1388. 
137 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006). 
138 Id. at 341.  
139 Id. at 336.  
140 Id. at 340. 
141 Id. at 352−53 (King, J., dissenting); see generally Brake, supra note 40, at 121. 
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V. NEW JERSEY’S RECENT INTERPRETATION OF THE LAD IN 
BATTAGLIA 
Despite the Supreme Court decisions broadening the basis for 
retaliation claims, scholars and commentators continually criticize the 
federal courts for failing to protect employee rights in the workplace, 
giving rise to a call for state laws and courts to fill the gaps in protection 
left by federal statutes and the judiciary.142  The LAD and the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Battaglia v. United Parcel Service, 
Inc. may have filled one of the gaps.143 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey effectively lowered the standard 
for establishing a claim of retaliation under the LAD in Battaglia, which 
held that as long as an employee can demonstrate a good-faith belief that 
the conduct complained of violated the LAD or possibly that the conduct 
was simply inconsistent with the objectives of the LAD, he or she is not 
required to show actual discrimination against an identifiable victim.144  
Michael Battaglia was an employee of defendant United Parcel Service, 
Inc. (UPS), in a supervisory position, and a subordinate to defendant 
Wayne DeCraine.145  In September 2005, Battaglia was demoted.146  He 
alleged that the demotion was retaliation for complaints he made about 
DeCraine’s conduct.147  According to the plaintiff, DeCraine made a 
number of sexually inappropriate comments about female employees of 
UPS.148  DeCraine made those remarks only in the presence of male 
employees, and no comment was made to, or in front of, any female 
 
142 See Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 
187, 193 (2008) (stating that after a series of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 
Americans with Disabilities Act's definition of disability in a restrictive fashion, the focus of 
disability rights advocates shifted to “trying to change the definition of disability in state 
laws”); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States Out of the Workplace, 117 YALE J.L. 225, 225 (2008) 
(noting the “recent movement to . . . increas[e] states' power to regulate the workplace”); see 
generally Sandra F. Sperino, Diminishing Deference: Learning Lessons from Recent 
Congressional Rejection of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of Discrimination Statutes, 33 
RUTGERS L. REC. 40 (2009) (arguing that “blind adherence to federal interpretations of 
discrimination principles on state employment discrimination claims is not only often 
inappropriate, but also has seriously impacted the development of employment discrimination 
law”). 
143 214 N.J. 518 (2013). 
144 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to 10:5-42 (West 2014); Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 547−51. 
145 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 526–27. 
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
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employee.149  The comments included using the word “c***” in reference 
to several women; using the phrase “f***ing b****” in reference to one 
particular woman; discussing pornographic websites; referencing an 
administrative staff member’s “big tits;” expressing a desire to engage in 
sexual activity with a female employee; and referencing an employee 
named “Regina” as “Vagina.”150  Plaintiff alleged that he spoke with 
DeCraine about the comments, met with the center’s supervisors who 
heard the remarks concerning their inappropriateness, and wrote an 
anonymous letter to UPS’s corporate Human Resources manager in 
January 2005 alleging that, “the leaders of the district used langu[age] 
you wouldn’t use with your wors[t] nightmare[.]”151 
The plaintiff claimed that his demotion violated the LAD because it 
was in retaliation for his complaints regarding DeCraine’s offensive 
comments about female employees.152  The appellate court overturned a 
jury verdict for the plaintiff on his LAD claim, holding that, absent an 
impact on a female employee, the plaintiff’s complaints could not 
constitute protected activity under the LAD and consequently, were not 
protected.153  The appellate court relied mostly on statutory interpretation, 
reasoning that the LAD prohibits an employer from discriminating 
against an employee based on sex and prohibits reprisals against a person 
who opposes practices forbidden under the statute.154  The court concluded 
that without evidence of sex discrimination against women or a hostile 
work environment, there could be no recovery for retaliation.155 
In overturning the appellate courts holding concerning the LAD 
claim, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized the “broad remedial 
purposes” of the LAD.156  These purposes include not only protecting the 
rights of individual employees, but also protecting the public’s strong 
interest in a discrimination free workplace.157  The court noted, “the 
 
149 Id. at 529. 
150 Id. 
151 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 526–27. 
152 Id. at 518.  Plaintiff also alleged that his demotion violated the Conscientious 
Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J. STAT. ANN. Sections 34:19-1 to 34:19-14, as he was 
retaliated against for complaining about improper employee conduct in the company; the 
appellate division affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff on his CEPA claim and the New 
Jersey Supreme Court reversed.  Id.  
153 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 529. 
154 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a), (d) (West 2014). 
155 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 546–49.  
156 Id. (citing Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 603–04 (1993)).  
157 Id. (quoting Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 600).  
SAVIO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2015  2:40 PM 
144 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1 
language attributed to DeCraine is particularly vile, demeaning and 
offensive, bespeaking attitudes and view [sic] about women that have no 
place in a work setting.”158  In explaining why the broad remedial purposes 
of the LAD would not be advanced if Battaglia was not protected, the 
court emphasized that, “[t]hese were not the occasional words of a low-
level employee having a bad day, but were the words of a supervisor, 
uttered in meetings attended by managerial employees, both repeatedly 
and routinely.”159  Battaglia’s allegations of offensive language 
concerning protected classes under the LAD supported a retaliation cause 
of action despite the fact that the language was not directed toward 
women and did not create an actionable claim for either disparate impact 
or hostile work environment. 
The court was unclear as to whether it was articulating a new, lower 
standard for the LAD retaliation claims, or simply articulating a natural 
consequence of the good faith reasonable belief standard for complaints 
of retaliation already ingrained in New Jersey case law.  For example, the 
court noted: 
[W]hen an employee voices a complaint about behavior or activities 
in the workplace that he or she thinks are discriminatory, we do not 
demand that he or she accurately understand the nuances of the LAD 
or that he or she be able to prove that there was an identifiable 
discriminatory impact upon someone of the requisite protected class.160 
If a reasonable good faith complaint is all that is required for an 
employee to be protected from retaliation, it naturally follows that there 
can be no requirement of an identifiable discriminatory impact.  The court 
has consistently looked at the attitude and mind of the complaining 
employee, not at the acts of the employer. 
 
VI.  ANALYSIS 
The New Jersey’s Supreme Court’s interpretation of the LAD and 
application of the reasonable good faith standard appears to be in line 
with the reasoning in most recent Supreme Court retaliation cases, apart 
from Nassar and Breeden.  The New Jersey Supreme Court overturned 
the appellate decision, which relied on strict statutory interpretation, and 
followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court by broadly 
interpreting this remedial anti-retaliation statute based upon its “purpose” 
 
158 Id. at 547–48. 
159 Id.  
160 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 545–49.   
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of eradicating discrimination in the workplace.161 
The good faith reasonable belief standard, when correctly applied, 
furthers the goal and purpose of anti-retaliation provisions, especially 
when compared to the actual language of the statutes, which only protects 
conduct opposing actual violations.162  If courts were to rely exclusively 
on statutory language, and not on the good faith reasonable belief 
standard, the loopholes in employee protection could allow a 
discriminatory and retaliatory employer to escape liability due to what 
seem to be technicalities in the law.  In terms of interpreting retaliation 
provisions particularly broadly, there is also a strong public policy 
argument for courts to allow a retaliation claim to stand based on the good 
faith reasonable belief of the plaintiff, rather than the actual existence of 
discriminatory behaviors.  If plaintiffs lost their jobs or faced some other 
form of retaliation because they misinterpreted the law, they may be 
dissuaded from reporting behavior they believe to be a violation of the 
statute. 
For example, if the Little court applied the Battaglia reasoning to the 
facts of that case, Little’s good faith belief in the unlawfulness of the 
racially derogatory statement made by his co-worker would have been 
sufficient to support his claim for retaliation, regardless of whether or not 
the statement violated substantive law.  Therefore, Little would have been 
protected against the retaliatory action of his employer. 
There is a danger, however, in broadening statutory interpretation 
too much and relying solely on judicial discretion in retaliation cases.  
The possibility of frivolous claims brought by those who simply had their 
feelings hurt in the office or those who legitimately lost their jobs based 
on bad performance poses a real judicial economic threat.  Arguably, the 
protection against frivolous claims using the good faith reasonable belief 
standard is the reasonableness requirement.  However, the court in 
Battaglia focused almost entirely on the good faith of the plaintiff’s 
complaints, rather than on the reasonableness of his complaints.  This 
aspect of the opinion may open the door for frivolous claims and creates 
 
161 Id. at 560–62.  
162 But cf. Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's Anti-retaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 375, 375 n. 437 (2010); Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: 
The Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities 
Under Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1130–31 (2007) (arguing 
that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision should protect employees who report on an employer 
in subjective good faith, even if the employee is wrong or the employee's belief is 
unreasonable). 
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a problem of precedent for lower courts to rely on in interpreting the 
reasonableness of a plaintiff’s belief. 
General issues exist in the interpretation of the good faith reasonable 
belief standard, as lower federal courts have applied the reasonable belief 
standard in different ways.163  Some treat it like a requirement that an 
employee report actual violations of the law, while others ignore the 
reasonableness requirement altogether.164  One of the major reasons for 
the adoption of the reasonable good faith standard is the fact that it is 
unfair to require a layperson to know the nuances of anti-discrimination 
statutes.165  According to the Eleventh Circuit in Harper, however, a 
layperson should be required to know the precedent in the jurisdiction 
before voicing his or her complaints in order to remain objectively 
reasonable.166  Applying the standard and reasoning of Battaglia, 
however, the plaintiff’s claims in Harper would have been better received 
by the court, unless the employer could have shown bad faith or that their 
belief in the unlawfulness of requiring male employees to be well 
groomed was so unreasonable that it bordered upon bad faith. 
Just as the application of the Supreme Court’s good faith reasonable 
belief standard varies in lower courts, the actual impact of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s holding in Battaglia is unclear.  The decision could 
simply be looking to the guidance of federal court decisions on Title VII 
and applying a good faith reasonable standard, which is sensitive to the 
fact that most lay people are unaware of the nuances of an expansive anti-
discrimination statute such as the LAD.  Although not explicitly, the 
decision may also have eliminated the reasonable belief requirement 
entirely, as it focuses almost exclusively on the good faith of Battaglia’s 
belief.  This interpretation would mean the New Jersey Supreme Court 
has taken employee protection a step further than the United States 
 
163 Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1385 (11th Cir. 1998); Little v. 
United Techs., 103 F.3d 956, 956 (11th Cir. 1997); Moberly, supra note 163, at 375 n. 438; 
Rosenthal, supra note 163, at 1162–63 (“[M]any courts . . . do not seem to be taking into 
account the ‘limited knowledge’ most Title VII plaintiffs have about the contours of Title VII, 
and the courts have consistently ruled against employees after concluding that their belief of 
a Title VII violation was not objectively reasonable.”). 
164 Battaglia, 214 N.J. at 526; Harper, 139 F.3d at 1385; Little, 103 F.3d at 956; Moberly, 
supra note 163, at 375 n. 438; Rosenthal, supra note 159, at 1162–63 (“[M]any courts . . . do 
not seem to be taking into account the ‘limited knowledge’ most Title VII plaintiffs have 
about the contours of Title VII, and the courts have consistently ruled against employees after 
concluding that their belief of a Title VII violation was not objectively reasonable.”). 
165 Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 53 (2006). 
166 Harper, 139 F.3d at 1385. 
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Supreme Court—a step that may not apply under the federal anti-
discrimination laws in light of the Supreme Court’s recent narrow 
interpretation in Nasser. 
There has been criticism from legal scholars who argue that the 
reasonable belief doctrine is simply a “poor proxy for addressing 
weaknesses in the plaintiff’s proof of causation.”167  If that were the case, 
the removal of such a requirement would force courts to address the 
causation issue transparently and straightforwardly, which may clear 
confusion in its application.168  Further, a reasonableness standard without 
further clarification allows courts to continue to measure the 
reasonableness of a plaintiff’s belief based on the substantive underlying 
law, which is contrary to the broad remedial purposes of anti-
discrimination statutes. 
Finally, and most radically, the Battaglia decision focuses so much 
on the “purpose” and “values” of the statute, that it may in fact be used 
by lower courts to support a claim of retaliation when plaintiffs oppose 
any action that is contrary to the “spirit” of the LAD.  This interpretation 
would significantly broaden the scope of the statute and allow for a great 
deal of judicial discretion in determining what actions offend the general 
purpose of this expansive statute. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The New Jersey Supreme Court must clarify the good faith 
reasonable belief standard as it was articulated in Battaglia.  Although 
the standard has had some success in Title VII and other federal 
retaliation cases, and allows for some needed discretion to eliminate 
protection loopholes afforded by the statute alone, some interpretation 
problems exist.  Frivolous claims may pass muster under a test that pays 
little attention to reasonableness or is based entirely on the “spirit” of a 
statute.  Furthermore, the lack of horizontal equity bound to occur when 
lower courts are asked to implement a standard that arguably has three 
rational interpretations and offers little guidance will prove to be an issue 
in New Jersey courts. 
Interpreting the LAD with sensitivity to the fact that lay people are 
unaware of the nuances of the law, while still requiring that the plaintiff’s 
belief be reasonable, would not only be in line with the plaintiff-friendly 
 
167 See Brake, supra note 40, at 156. 
168 Brake, supra note 40, at 156. 
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purpose of the LAD, but would also allow courts to guard against 
frivolous claims.  Finally, a plaintiff-friendly reasonableness standard 
would provide adequate guidance to lower courts, ensuring that courts do 
not continue to require plaintiffs to be correct about the underlying 
substantive law. 
 
